Understanding and influencing the policy process

This essay translates some of the underlying logic of existing research of policy processes into a set of strategies for shaping policy agendas and influencing policy development and change. The argument builds from a synthesized model of the individual and a simplified depiction of the political system. Three overarching strategies are introduced that operate at the policy subsystem level: developing deep knowledge; building networks; and participating for extended periods of time. The essay then considers how a democratic ethic can inform these strategies. Ultimately, the success or failure of influencing the policy process is a matter of odds, but these odds could be changed favorably if individuals employ the three strategies consistently over time. The conclusion contextualizes the arguments and interprets the strategies offered as a meta-theoretical argument of political influence.

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Notes

The field of policy process literature offers valid and useful knowledge generated from rigorous scientific approaches to data collection and analysis about the development of public policy over time. Depictions in a recent public policy handbook by Moran et al. (2006, p. 5) and repeated by Smith and Larimer (2009, p. 1) that policy process literature within public policy is more “mood than a science” is inaccurate. Indeed, to find the “scientific” approach in policy process research, people need look no further than to Dr. Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize for her work within the institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom 1990, 2005) or to Drs. Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner’s arguments on institutional friction affecting incremental and punctuated policy change (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2003). Of course, many unanswered questions remain. We recognize the challenges facing policy process researchers (Greenberg et al. 1977) and the numerous theories characterizing the field, some of which are stronger than others (Sabatier 1991, 2007). The persistence of some theories over others is possibly one indication of growth and progress in the field.

For those wanting specific tactical recommendations on civic engagement, we refer readers to Gerston (2008) and Dalton (2008).

It is most important to recognize that the rational actor model found in economics and public choice theories, which assumes perfect rationality, utility maximization and often perfect abilities to process information, does not accurately depict the behavior of individuals operating in policy processes. While these assumptions might be useful in market settings, they have been shown empirically and theoretically not to apply to the action situations found in policy processes (see among many the arguments in Jones 2001; Ostrom et al. 1994; Poteete et al. 2010).

We purposively exclude the physical, geographic conditions from this initial discussion. Our rationale is not at all that these factors are unimportant for we address them in the next section. Instead, we argue that the constitutional features of a political system as found in the United States and the resulting emergence of subsystems and action situations is applicable across all problem contexts.

Policy subsystems themselves can be integrated into or around the more generic concept of “action situations.” Action situations can be defined as any human choice situation with two or more actors where collective outcomes emerge (Ostrom 2005). Thus, subsystems can be thought of as a very large “action situation,” but they are better conceptualized as having many other action situations nested within them. Both subsystems and action situations outside the subsystem than can affect affairs within the subsystem (for similar logic see Poteete et al. 2010, p. 235).

The astute observer of the policy process literature will note the different of interpretations of policy subsystems. Some anchor the concept toward the traditional iron triangle or subgovernment concept with strong connections to a legislative subcommittee (Jochim and May 2010). Others de-emphasize the subcommittee concept and instead focus on subsystem nestedness and interdependence (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010). We emphasize the latter.

While we claim similar arguments could be made in parliamentary and corporatist systems, we leave the nuances of these arguments to others.

The ACF lists four paths, but we simplify them to three in this essay (Sabatier and Weible 2007) and because the theoretical distinction between internal and external shocks continues to evolve (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010).

Undoubtedly, however, learning about some of the causal mechanisms between events and subsystem change is partly a function of the event itself but even more related to the actual context of the subsystem (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010).

Other interpretations of the normative part of a belief system deal with cultural types be them hierarchists (strong identity to groups and strong allegiance to externally imposed prescriptions, such as rules and traditions), individualists (weak identity to groups and external prescriptions), egalitarians (strong identify to groups with weak constraints from prescriptions), and fatalists (weak group identity and high constraints from imposed prescriptions) (Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006, p. 135–6). See also Stone’s (2001) characterization of goals as involving equity, efficiency, security, and liberty.

We prefer analytics instead of scientific and technical training because the term is more open to knowledge in fields outside of the sciences (e.g., the humanities or law). We also use the term analytics instead of discipline because some people have multiple disciplines or their disciplines poorly depict their actual disciplinary competencies.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

1. School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado Denver, 1380 Lawrence Street, Suite 500, Denver, CO, 80217, USA Christopher M. Weible, Tanya Heikkila & Peter deLeon
2. Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California Davis, 916 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA, 96616, USA Paul A. Sabatier

1. Christopher M. Weible